500 logo
The Data Behind Purchasing Behavior at UserVoice – Pricing for Conversion (Part I)

2013.07.18

500 Global Team

500 Global Team

Article image

This post was contributed by Richard White, founder & CEO of UserVoice, a leading customer feedback & support platform. He’ll speak at the next unSEXY conference on Friday, August 9. Early bird ticket sales end TONIGHT at 11:59pm, PST, so REGISTER NOW and save.

One of the biggest challenges I’ve found with running a SaaS business is the lack of real data put out there about how mechanics changes to the sign up funnel impact key conversion metrics. For my unSEXY Conf talk last year I wanted to do what I could to contribute what we’ve learned at UserVoice over the various changes we’ve made, to both our sign up process and to our pricing model itself.

I’ll be giving a follow-up to that talk this year but I wanted to catch everyone up on what was covered last year. So without further ado here is, in chronological order, the various changes we made and data we have on outcomes.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.009

UserVoice was a completely free product for the first 10 months of it’s (public) existence and had a pretty healthy 39% month-over-month growth in account sign ups.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.012

We cut that growth in half overnight simply by announcing that we were going to being introducing paid plans. You couldn’t even yet sign up for them – just fill out a lead form. It should also be noted that these new plans, for the most part, included features that weren’t currently available.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.014

This was alarming. However a further analysis showed that we double the rate of active accounts after 30 days. So basically all we had done was drive away users that probably weren’t the best fit for our service.

One other thing to note is that once we did launch paid plans people that had signed up prior to their introduction converted to paid plans at roughly ¼ the rate of accounts that signed up after the plans were introduced. This is probably partly due to the fact that our plans were mainly feature, not usage, based so once you got up and running there was very little incentive to check out new premium features (like custom design, etc).

TAKEAWAY: Launching pricing earlier can help you find the real customers of your service and not be distracted by tire kickers.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.017

We originally announced only two paid plans (priced at $289 & $589 / mo) but we got a lot of feedback (via our own UserVoice forum) that people wanted sub-$100 plans.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.018

We listened and added those at launch leaving us with 5 plans.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.019

However we found 77% of our revenue came from two of these plans: Gold ($589/mo – 35% of revenue) and Bronze ($89/mo – 42%). The Silver plan ($289/mo) was what I call a “wedge plan”: it didn’t have a ton of extra features over Bronze as it was simply designed to make it easier for you to either stay at $89 or justify making the jump to $589 (“Gold has so many more features than Silver why not pay the extra amount”). Tin ($19/mo) had a lot of accounts but at such a lower price point (relative to the others) it was never going to be a significant amount of revenue.

TAKEAWAY: Some pricing plans exist simply to make other plans look better.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.020

Because we serviced a lot of young companies (non-profits & government agencies) we heavily utilized discounts to give them access to our plans at price points they could afford.

We had 13% of paid accounts on some sort of discount (if we exclude folks on 100% discounts through various incubator / grant programs) with an average discount of 52%. Not surprisingly the LTVs on these discounted accounts were lower (17%) than non-discounted accounts. But this is offset by the fact that (at the time of this analysis) they were also 17% less likely to have churned.

TAKEAWAY: Discounts can be a useful tool for driving conversions without undermining long term LTV. However heavy usage might signal issues with your pricing structure.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.021

At one point early on we tried having usage limits on the number of users who could give you feedback be part of our plan structure. Since most of our plans were feature based we saw very few upgrades post-trial. We wanted to add usage limits so that we could drive upgrades that scaled as the account scaled up it’s activity.

This was a huge failure. It created what I call a success penalty: the more successful you were in activating your users to give you feedback the more expensive the product became. On some level this made sense but since no one knew how to estimate this future usage it just created uncertainty about committing to a product without knowing the future cost of it. It was especially problematic because we were often working with young companies who didn’t know or were very optimistic about their future active user levels (and equally optimistic about what % of them would engage on UserVoice and give them feedback). It put us in the awkward position of tempering a customer’s enthusiasm about their use of our product (aka “There’s no way you’ll have 300K people on your site in 60 days time”).

When we removed the usage limits, which were designed to drive upgrades, we actually saw that upgrades increased 33%!

TAKEAWAY: If you’re going to price on usage it needs to be on usage the customer has control over (number of seats, minutes used, etc)

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.022

At one point move from a 15 day free trial to a 30 day free trial. This had no measurable impact on any metric that we track. We kept it at 30 days purely for marketing reasons.

UnSexy 2012 - Pricing for Conversion.023

 Moving from requiring a credit card up front to not requiring a credit card (until the end of the trial) had no effect on overall conversions.

The general view is that not requiring a credit card up front is good for new services where customers don’t quite know the value of a service. So this switch may have been more beneficial if we had made it earlier but by this point UserVoice was pretty well established and you knew what you were getting into. One group that really loved this switch was our support team – they now had a lot less angry emails from customers who had auto-converted (since you had to remember to close your account before the trial ended or be charged) and needed a refund (which we always gave).

Phew! That’s a lot to digest but yet we’re only halfway there. In Part II (coming out tomorrow) we’ll cover a whole new set of experiments including our most successful one ever.

And if you enjoyed this content then you’ll want to be at this year’s UnSexy conference on August 9th where I’ll be diving into changes from this last year including:

  • Migrating $5 plans to free

  • Not running billing on the weekends

  • Even bigger pricing changes (see uservoice.com/plans for a sneak preview)

  • … and much more

I hope to see you there!

Come back tomorrow for Part 2, where Richard dives even deeper into the unSEXY world of pricing!

1. AS OF 30 JUNE 2023. ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT (“AUM”) STATED HEREIN ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST $100M AND ARE CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC FORM ADV PART 1A INSTRUCTION 5.B. TO INCLUDE THE CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR FAIR VALUE) OF ALL PRIVATE FUND ASSETS AND THE CONTRACTUAL AMOUNT OF ANY UNCALLED COMMITMENTS TO SUCH PRIVATE FUNDS, TOGETHER WITH THE CURRENT MARKET VALUE OF ALL OTHER SECURITIES PORTFOLIOS FOR WHICH 500 STARTUPS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, L.L.C. OR ITS AFFILIATES PROVIDES ONGOING DISCRETIONARY INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, WITH MARKET VALUE DETERMINED USING THE SAME METHOD USED TO REPORT ACCOUNT VALUES TO CLIENTS OR TO CALCULATE FEES FOR INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES. ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT MAY INCREASE OR DECREASE SIGNIFICANTLY OVER TIME.

2. AS OF 30 JUNE 2023 AND INCLUDES PRIVATE, PUBLIC AND EXITED COMPANIES. FOR EXITED POSITIONS, VALUATION DATE IS DATE OF EXIT. THESE FIGURES ARE ESTIMATES, AGGREGATED ACROSS ALL PORTFOLIO COMPANIES HELD ACROSS ALL FUNDS ADVISED BY 500 STARTUPS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC AND ITS AFFILIATES, AND ARE BASED ON INTERNAL DATA THAT HAS NOT BEEN EXTERNALLY VERIFIED AND RELIES ON PORTFOLIO INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY EXTERNAL SOURCES WHICH HAS NOT BEEN VERIFIED, MAY NOT BE ACCURATE OR UPDATED. THESE VALUATIONS ARE ESTIMATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 500 GLOBAL’S VALUATION POLICY. SEE 500.CO/COMPANIES FOR A FULL LIST OF PORTFOLIO COMPANIES. PAST PERFORMANCE DOES NOT GUARANTEE FUTURE RETURNS. PORTFOLIO COMPANIES DISPLAYED ON THIS PAGE ARE NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL INVESTMENTS IN VEHICLES MANAGED BY 500 STARTUPS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, L.L.C. (TOGETHER WITH ITS AFFILIATES, “500 GLOBAL”) AND THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT THE INVESTMENTS WILL BE PROFITABLE OR THAT OTHER INVESTMENTS MADE IN THE FUTURE WILL HAVE SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS OR RESULTS. THIS LIST INCLUDES CURRENT AND FORMER 500 GLOBAL PORTFOLIO COMPANIES WHICH HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED AS WELL AS COMPANIES WHICH HAVE UNDERGONE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING. THIS LIST IS UPDATED PERIODICALLY AND AS SUCH MAY NOT REFLECT RECENT 500 GLOBAL INVESTMENTS. PAST RESULTS OF 500 GLOBAL INVESTMENTS, POOLED INVESTMENT VEHICLES, OR INVESTMENT STRATEGIES ARE NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. NO CONTENT ON THIS PAGE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN OFFER TO SELL OR SOLICITATION OF INTEREST TO PURCHASE ANY SECURITIES, CONSTRUCTED AS FUND MARKETING MATERIALS BY PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS CONSIDERING AN INVESTMENT INTO ANY 500 GLOBAL FUND, OR USED AS THE BASIS FOR ANY INVESTMENT DECISIONS. ALL LOGOS, NAMES, AND TRADEMARKS OF THIRD PARTIES REFERENCED HEREIN ARE THE TRADEMARKS AND LOGOS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. ANY INCLUSION OF SUCH TRADEMARKS OR LOGOS DOES NOT IMPLY OR CONSTITUTE ANY APPROVAL, ENDORSEMENT OR SPONSORSHIP OF 500 GLOBAL BY SUCH OWNERS.

3. AS OF 30 JUNE 2023. INCLUDES LOCATION OF EMPLOYEES, CONTRACTORS AND CONSULTANTS.
Copyright © 2024. 500 Global  All rights reserved.
xfacebookinstagramlinkedin